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Party systems – and support for the parties that comprise them – develop and evolve in 
response to three broad sets of factors: electoral rules; the actions and decisions of political 
elites; and the political beliefs, attitudes and preferences of mass publics.  The evolution of 
the UK’s party system since 1945 reflects the tension between the strong constraining impact 
of electoral rules and deep-seated, long-term changes in public opinion.  Declining party 
identification and increasing popular disillusion with Labour and the Conservatives have 
weakened what, for the two main governing parties, were the ‘virtuous circle’ effects of First-
Past-the-Post elections.  These long-term changes have stimulated movement towards a 
multi-party system – although, as UKIP’s experience in the 2015 general election showed, 
FPTP can still reassert its virtuous (or in this case, vicious)  circle effects.  This paper reviews 
the factors that have underpinned the UK’s changing party systems over the last six decades.  
It argues that, partly as a result of recent decisions by Labour and Conservative elites, UK 
public opinion is now ripe for a party system realignment.  With the Conservatives divided 
over Europe and human rights, and Labour divided over immigration and whether the party 
should be primarily a party of government or a protest movement, an important opportunity 
has opened up for a resurgence of the liberal political centre.  The key issue is whether or not 
sufficient politicians from the centrist factions of Labour and the Conservatives possess the 
will and courage to develop it. 
Part 1 of this paper reviews the conventional wisdom about the relationship between electoral 
rules and patterns of party competition.  Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954) has undoubtedly 
acted as a constraint on the development of parties that could challenge the post-war 
dominance of Labour and the Conservatives.  However, it is also the case that the UK’s party 
system (or more correctly, party systems if we consider local government and the devolved 
assemblies in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales as well as the Westminster parliament) 
has become increasingly fragmented since 1945.  Part 2 briefly documents this increasing 
fragmentation.  It outlines the decline of the Westminster two-party vote since the 1950s; the 
increasing number of local councils where no single party has overall control, especially after 
2000; and the clear multi-party systems (encouraged by electoral rules that include a 
proportional component in terms of regional lists) that have characterised each of the UK’s 
devolved assemblies since 1998.  The section also examines the increasing disproportionality 
between parties’ vote shares and seat shares in the Westminster parliament, a phenomenon 
that has grown as the vote shares of the two major parties have declined.   
Part 3 examines the main factors that have contributed to the increasing party fragmentation 
at Westminster.  It differentiates between explanatory factors that are capable of being 
measured systematically, in terms of both their extent and their impact on fragmentation, and 
those that are not.  Among the ‘unmeasurable factors’are the long-term decline in deference 
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towards received wisdom and elite judgment; the rise of new regional, ethnic and religious 
identities; increased media criticism (including social media criticism) of conventional 
politics and politicians; and the unintended consequences of elite decisions.  Key among the 
measurable factors are the long-term decline in party identification and the gradual 
weakening of class-based voting.  The final section considers the prospects for a new 
realignment of the Westminster party system. It analyses recently collected survey data which 
show that Authoritarian Populist attitudes are widespread among the UK mass public.  
Cluster analysis suggests that there are now four distinct ‘political tribes’ among UK voters, 
defined in terms of their left-right positions and their attitudes towards Europe, immigration, 
human rights and Britain’s foreign policy role in the world.  A new centre party could make a 
strong electoral appeal to a large proportion of two of these tribes, acting as a bulwark against 
the otherwise likely election of future authoritarian populist governments at Westminster. 
1. First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) versus increasing party fragmentation, 1945-2016 
The UK has always had a rather more complex party structure than the simple two- or two-
and-a-half party system typically used by comparative political analysts to characterise the 
Westminster parliament.  Many towns and cities in Great Britain have evolved local party 
systems, particularly since 1945, which look very different from the classic 
Conservative/Labour/Liberal (Democrat) Westminster model. Northern Ireland has had its 
own distinctive system, variously instituted, since the 1920s.  And since devolution in the late 
1990s, Scotland and Wales have developed entirely new systems that have in turn evolved in 
different ways over time.  This said, Duverger’s conclusions about the impact of FPTP or 
plurality electoral rules on party competition have proved a useful way of explaining why the 
Conservatives and Labour have maintained their electoral dominance for most of the post-
war period – and of explaining why third parties without a clear regional base have found it 
extraordinarily difficult to make an electoral breakthrough.   
The core of Duverger’s analysis is very straightforward:  plurality voting, over time, 
encourages competition between two broad-based, catch-all parties, making it difficult for 
third parties to challenge the two-party status quo. On occasion, of course, a minor party 
might be able to sustain itself under FPTP (especially if could make some sort of local or 
regional appeal) or one of the two parties might even (temporarily) achieve the status of a 
‘dominant party’.  However, for the two major parties under FPTP, a ‘virtuous circle’ 
calculus of voting and activism tends to operate – which for any challenger party, by 
implication, acts as a vicious circle.  Voters and political activists learn, either in advance or 
through experience, that third party votes and activism tend to be wasted in terms of gaining 
parliamentary seats.  Both voters and would-be activists accordingly gravitate towards one or 
other of the two major parties, even if this involves voting tactically for a lesser evil or, for 
the activist, ‘compromising’ with the dominant values of the party s/he has decided to join.  
This gravitation effect in turn squeezes the third party vote, which encourages the sense after 
an election that third party voting and activism have been wasteful – thus reinforcing the 
FPTP virtuous/vicious circle.  The counterpoint to plurality voting rules, of course, is 
Proportional Representation (PR) in its various forms.  In Duverger’s view, PR encourages 
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multi-party competition, since under PR there are fewer (if any) wasted votes or wasted 
activism.  This enables ‘sincere’ voting (that is, genuine first preference voting) to 
predominate and ensures that the public’s preferences – however fragmented they might be – 
can be reasonably accurately translated into parliamentary seats.  For Duverger, it is no 
accident (as subsequent studies have repeatedly shown) that plurality systems exhibit the 
highest disparities between parties’ vote shares and parliamentary seat shares and that these 
disparities are associated (other things being equal) with higher levels of dissatisfaction with 
democracy. 
Plurality electoral rules, of course, do not mean there is no serious challenge to existing 
parties. Irish nationalists made a successful challenge to the dominant Conservative and 
Liberal parties in the first two decades of the twentieth century, resulting in Irish 
independence in 1922.  And Labour successfully supplanted the Liberal Party in the decade 
or so after the First World War.  The logic of the FPTP virtuous circle soon reasserted itself, 
however. The Liberals received only seven percent of the popular vote in the 1931 general 
election – a position from which they did not really start to recover until 1974.  Yet it is clear 
that over the last 40 years or so, the Conservative/Labour two-party system at Westminster 
has transmuted into a form of ‘unbalanced multi-partism’ – involving the Conservatives, 
Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP and Plaid Cymru – even though the electoral rules have not 
changed.   Electoral rules do not determine party competition, though they do constrain it in 
different ways.  Regionally-focused or national parties can clearly prosper under FPTP but 
those parties which lack either a clear regional/national base (like the SNP and PC and to a 
lesser extent the Liberals) or a class demographic (like the Conservatives and Labour, at least 
in the past) find that their support, even if it is considerable, can be spread so thinly as to 
deliver no real electoral payoff.  UKIP’s experience in the 2015 general election, with twelve 
percent of the popular vote and only one parliamentary seat to show for it, is a clear 
testimony to the dangers of ‘no distinctive demographic’.  All this said, the experiences of the 
devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland clearly support the Duverger 
thesis that the introduction of a substantial PR component in the electoral process strongly 
encourages multi-partism: since their inception, all the newly devolved assemblies (as 
demonstrated in the next section) have been characterised by multi-party competition. 
2. The fragmentation of Westminster, Devolved Assembly and Local Council voting in 
historical perspective 
The time-scales over which changes in party competition can usefully be analysed vary 
according to the different levels of governance.  For Westminster elections, the earliest 
reference point is generally considered to be 1832, when the UK’s modern party system, 
focusing on competition between Conservatives and Liberals, was initiated.  For the devolved 
assemblies, the simplest start date is the first set of post-devolution elections – 1998 in 
Northern Ireland and 1999 in Scotland and Wales.  For local elections, the position is 
complicated by the significant changes in local authority boundaries and designations that 
have been introduced, particularly since 1945.  The most consistent basis for an over-time 
comparison is to consider the electoral position in the UK’s major cities (excluding London, 
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which has had a variety of distinctive arrangements) since 1945.  The discussion here focuses 
initially on the vote shares obtained by the various parties, turning then to discuss the 
relationship between vote shares and seat shares in the national, Westminster context. 
Westminster. Figure 1 reports the changes in party vote shares for the Westminster parliament 
between 1832 and 2015.  Until 1910, support for the Conservatives and Liberals was 
overwhelming, with very low levels of support for other parties.  From 1918 to 1931 there 
was a period of transition in which Labour replaced the Liberals as one of the two ‘major’ 
parties able to benefit from the FPTP virtuous circle.  From the mid1950s, there was a 
gradual decline in the combined Labour and Conservative share of the vote, with a 
concomitant rise in support for the Liberals (Liberal-Democrats) and ‘Other’.1  By 2015, the 
constraining effects of FPTP had loosened sufficiently for roughly a third of the electorate to 
decide to vote for parties other than Labour and the Conservatives. Support for UKIP (at 12.5 
percent) was part of the explanation for the loosening. However, as Figure 2 shows, another 
part of the story was the success of nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland.  Plaid Cymru 
and the Scottish National Party started to attract very small percentages of Welsh and Scottish 
votes respectively in Westminster elections in 1931 – but by 2015 this had grown to a 12 
percent share for PC in Wales and a massive 50 percent SNP share in the wake of the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum.   
Devolved Assemblies. Figures 3-5 show the changing vote share patterns for the three UK 
devolved assemblies after 1998.  In all three cases, given that roughly half the seats were 
awarded on the basis of parties’ vote shares for regional lists, votes were from the outset 
relatively evenly distributed across four or more parties. The devolved assemblies, in short, 
have consistently been characterised by multi-party systems. In Scotland in 1999, as Figure 3 
shows, Labour, the SNP, the Conservatives, Liberal-Democrats and even ‘Others’ secured 
substantial shares of the vote.  This pattern continued through 2003 and 2007, though by 
2011, the SNP had achieved a clear dominance, which was reinforced even more strongly in 
2016.  An analogous position is described in Figure 4, which presents equivalent data for 
Wales.  In 1999, four parties obtained substantial votes shares, though Labour and Plaid 
Cymru were in a sufficiently strong position to suggest that a two-party system could 
develop.  In fact, by 2003, PC had lost support to such an extent that Labour was clearly the 
dominant party, a position that it broadly maintained through to 2016.  The growth of UKIP, 
however, meant that by 2016 votes for the Welsh Assembly were distributed across five 
parties – each with Assembly representation. Finally, Figure 5 summarises the position in 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections since 1998. From the beginning, voting for the NI 
Assembly followed a very clear multi-party vote pattern, with votes distributed across five 
parties plus ‘others’.  By 2007, this had transmuted into a system in which, though still 
involving substantial voting for multiple parties, the Democratic Unionists and Sinn Fein had 
established themselves as the two dominant parties – though on only one occasion (the DUP 
in 2011) did either of them secure over 30 percent of the popular (list) vote. 
Local Councils.  As an illustration of the changing levels of fragmentation in UK local 
authority voting, Figure 6 reports the year-by-year variations in the number of major UK city 
councils (out of a total of 22 councils whose boundaries and status remained broadly stable 
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over the 1945-2016 period) in which there was No Overall Control (NOC) by a single party 
or formal coalition of parties.  The NOC characterisation is obviously an imperfect measure 
of voting fragmentation, but it does give a general indication of the extent to which the 
Conservative and Labour parties fail to perform effectively in local elections: a higher 
incidence of NOC, in short, reflects a higher level of local vote fragmentation.  Viewed in 
this light, Figure 6 shows that NOC is by no means a new phenomenon. Its incidence grew 
slowly in the 1970s and 1980s and increased markedly after 2000, with half of the 22 
councils in the sample group experiencing NOC in 2006.  As with Westminster voting, a 
constant set of electoral rules based on FPTP, is capable of producing some degree of voting 
fragmentation, notwithstanding Duverger’s Law. 
Vote shares, seat shares and disproportionality.  The evidence reported in Figures 1-6 shows 
that voting fragmentation has been a feature of UK representative democracy to varying 
degrees both over time and at the three levels reviewed. Party systems, however, are defined 
not just by voting patterns in any one series of elections, but also by the distribution of seats 
that result from the way votes are cast.  As noted earlier, FPTP is less likely than electoral 
rules based on some form of Proportional Representation accurately to translate vote shares 
into seat shares.  Typically, FPTP gives the winning party a parliamentary majority to govern 
only at the cost of depriving ‘minor’ parties of a ‘fair’ share of parliamentary seats.  Analysts 
have devised a number of different measures of vote share/seat share disproportionality.  
Most measures focus on the idea of the Effective Number of Parties.
2
  For any given 
parliament, this Effective Number can be calculated for the distributions of both vote shares 
and seat shares: the gap between the two is one way of summarising any vote/seat 
disproportionality.
3
  Figure 7 shows the gap between the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 
in terms of votes and seats at Westminster since 1900. Since 1918, the ENP in terms of votes 
has been higher than the ENP in terms of seats.  The gap narrowed briefly in the early 1950s, 
but since then it has been growing progressively so that by 2015 electors votes were spread 
across 3.9 Effective Parties whereas Commons seats were distributed to 2.5 Effective Parties.  
This considerable gap to a large extent reflects the way in which the FPTP virtuous circle still 
benefits Labour and the Conservatives as the two ‘major’ competing parties, even though the 
electorate has increasingly and repeatedly signalled its overall collective preference for a  
multi-party system. 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the extent to which UK local authority 
elections have historically produced a gap between ENP-votes and ENP-seats: this would 
involve a massive exercise in data collection and analysis that might well reveal nothing 
particularly interesting beyond an obvious parallel with what has been happening at 
Westminster since 1918.  However, as far as the devolved assemblies are concerned, a similar 
set of calculations to those reported in Figure 7 can be undertaken for the relatively short 
period since 1998.  Table 1 summarises the results of these calculations.  The ENP-votes 
scores are all higher than in the Westminster parliament – as would be expected given that 
half the seats in the devolved assemblies are allocated by PR.  However, as Table 1 shows, in 
all three contexts the ENP-seats scores are lower than their equivalent ENP-votes scores, 
implying that there is a degree of disproportionality even in the three devolved assemblies.  In 
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short, even in these assemblies the continuing FPTP component of the electoral rules 
constrains the representation of more peripheral parties, thereby reducing the degree of multi-
partism that would be expected purely on the basis of way people cast their votes. 
The broad conclusions suggested by the foregoing discussion are straightforward.  
Notwithstanding Britain’s tradition of First-Past-the-Post elections, the UK has been moving 
slowly towards a more fragmented, multi-party system since the 1950s.  The process of 
fragmentation has been gradual and punctuated by brief periods of above-trend advance, but 
it has been inexorable.  Voters have gradually been deserting the two major parties, even 
though the constraints of FPTP and its associated disproportionate translation of votes into 
seats have inhibited third-party (and fourth and fifth party) success.  The explicit provision 
for regional list votes as a complement to FPTP in the devolved assemblies in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland has reduced (though not eliminated) disproportionality in these 
assemblies.  Moreover, in Scotland and Wales, national assembly voting (as with European 
Parliament voting, which was based on PR regional lists from 1993) has almost certainly 
affected subsequent voting in Westminster elections.  It has broken old habits and allowed 
some voters to support parties they previously considered marginal:  Labour was almost a 
certainly a victim of this tendency in Scotland in the 2015 general election.  Devolution, in 
short, has probably accelerated the movement towards multi-partism in the Westminster 
parliament – even though FPTP still acts as a source of disproportionality by constraining the 
Effective Number of Parties in terms of seats. 
3. What explains the increasing fragmentation of the UK party system and the decline 
of support for Labour and the Conservatives? 
It is by no means a simple matter systematically to assess the factors that have undercut the 
‘virtuous circle’ of the post-war two-party system.  This is partly because the necessary data 
for evaluating the various possible explanations for vote (and, to a lesser extent, seat) 
fragmentation are unavailable and partly because of the statistical difficulty of estimating 
causal effects among variables that are potentially reciprocally related.  With these 
constraints in mind, I offer an analysis that is speculative but ‘consistent with the available 
evidence’, rather than one that rigorously tests a more limited set of precise explanatory 
claims.   
I begin with what I described earlier as the ‘unmeasurable’ factors.  These are ‘unmeasurable’ 
in two senses – in terms of being able (a) accurately to measure how they have changed over 
the period since the post-war two-party system began to fragment in the 1950s and, 
consequently, (b) to assess their effects on the fragmentation process itself.  There are 
arguably five main ‘unmeasurables’ that have contributed to party fragmentation.  The first is 
cultural – the decline of deference, the reduced preparedness of mass publics to defer to the 
wisdom, judgment and authority of elites.  There has obviously always been a disposition 
among some sections of the public to challenge the status quo. It is nonetheless clear from 
World Values Surveys (WVS) conducted since 1980 that deference as a general characteristic 
is much less prevalent, both in the UK and elsewhere in the developed world, than it was in 
the immediate post-war years.  The key evidence in this context relates to the levels of 
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deference shown by different cohorts of WVS respondents: the younger the cohort, the lower 
the level of deference displayed.  For example, those born after 1951 exhibit deference levels 
roughly half the levels shown by those born between 1921 and 1930 (Nevitte, 2011).  It is 
difficult to demonstrate that this general decline in deference has a direct impact on popular 
disaffection with the main parties of government, but it seems likely that it has played some 
sort of indirect role in increasing people’s doubts about the wisdom of the actions of 
successive (Labour and Conservative) governments. 
A second possible ‘unmeasurable’ factor underpinning party fragmentation relates to the rise 
of ‘alternative’ identities.  Gilbert and Sullivan’s Private Willis from Iolanthe is often quoted 
to exemplify the late nineteenth century orthodoxy about the importance and ubiquity of 
party identity: 
How Nature always does contrive… 
That every boy and every gal 
That’s born into the world alive 
Is either a little Liberal 
Or else a little Conservative! 
By the late 1930s, of course, Labour had substituted for the Liberals in popular affections.  
However, as demonstrated below, party identifications have declined significantly since the 
early 1960s.  They have been variously supplemented and replaced by a proliferation of new 
political and quasi-political identities – by Scottish and Welsh identities in those two 
countries, by ethnic and religious identities among the UK’s growing ethnic minority 
population (Heath et al, 2013), and even for some by European identity (Isernia et al, 2012).  
The difficulty with trying to assess the changing importance of these ‘new’ identities is that 
there are no reliable baseline data extending back in time that might enable any changes in 
identity patterns to be measured and assessed. This means that although we know that these 
identities are important (especially national identities in Scotland and Wales) in determining 
party choices now, it is not possible assess how far they have driven out old party identities 
and therefore contributed to party fragmentation. 
A third ‘unmeasurable’ source of fragmentation is the increased level of traditional media 
criticism of politicians, which has in turn increased popular disillusion with professional 
politicians and established parties.  It is easy to assert this proposition but far more difficult to 
demonstrate it.  Nonetheless, we are all familiar with the more confrontational style of 
political interviewing on radio and television that has developed in the UK over the last three 
decades or so.  And the Daily Telegraph and other newspapers have seemed to regard it 
almost as a duty in recent years to expose the peccadillos and errors of judgment made by 
politicians of all parties at every opportunity – a development that for many observers has 
contributed to the increasing lack of trust that voters have in politics and politicians (see for 
example, Whiteley et al, 2013).  Although it is very difficult to establish empirically either 
the extent to which these changes have occurred and whether or not they have affected 
fragmentation, it would be unwise to conclude that they have had no effect. 
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A similar conclusion is suggested with regard to a fourth possible source of party 
fragmentation: the rise and rise of social media conversations and exchanges.  Analysts are 
only starting to get a proper handle on how to measure and assess these exchanges but it 
seems clear from anecdotal evidence that most of them involve participants listening and 
talking to people largely like themselves.  The low transactions costs of social media 
interactions mean that it is relatively easy to form ever-smaller, more specialised political 
groupings in which the like-minded converse.  This clearly makes it easier for ‘groupthink’ 
mechanisms to operate and for participants to reinforce each other in their views and to 
convince themselves that those views (since they are rarely contradicted) are widely shared.  
Again, it is difficult to assess either the extent of such social media conversations or to show 
that they connected to party fragmentation – but it seems likely that they have helped to 
reinforce the fragmentation process in the relatively recent past and that they will continue to 
be of relevance in the future. 
The final ‘unmeasurable’ factor underpinning fragmentation concerns the unintended 
consequences of elite decisions.  It is all but impossible to demonstrate the connections 
between specific decisions and such a generalised long-term process as party fragmentation.  
In my view, however, there are three identifiable decisions that have had – and will continue 
to have – profound consequences for the unity and character of the Labour and Conservative 
parties.  The first was the Blair government’s decision to establish the Scottish parliament 
from 1999.  Blair’s aim in devolving power was to preserve the union between Scotland and 
the rest of the UK by making modest concessions to Scottish demands for increased decision-
making autonomy.  At the same time, Blair introduced part-PR electoral arrangements that 
would minimise the chances of an SNP-led Scottish government (since all the other parties 
were pro-union), thereby making it difficult for the SNP to build further momentum for its 
core cause of independence.   In the event, of course, Blair’s plans rapidly went awry.  In 
May 2007, the first SNP minority administration took office in Holyrood. It was so successful 
that it was elected with a majority in 2011.  The knock-on consequence of the SNP’s 
domestic success, even in the wake of an unsuccessful referendum in 2014, was that the party 
annihilated Labour in Scotland in the 2015 Westminster elections.  To the delight of all lovers 
of irony, Labour’s Scotland strategy had had the very opposite effect of what was intended – 
and party fragmentation at Westminster had been reinforced. 
The second elite decision that increased the tendency towards party fragmentation at 
Westminster was Ed Miliband’s reform of Labour leader-election rules in March 2014.  John 
Smith had introduced One Member One Vote (OMOV) in September 1993, but the voting 
power of party activists had been curbed by the continuing existence of an electoral college in 
which MPs, MEPs and trade unions were also represented.  Miliband’s reforms introduced 
genuine OMOV and these operated for the first time in July 2015, following his resignation 
after the 2015 election defeat.  The empowerment of the grass roots activists that this implied, 
combined with Labour MPs decision to include Jeremy Corbyn as one of the balloted 
candidates for leader, produced an overwhelming victory for Corbyn as the representative of 
the party’s radical left (a victory that was confirmed in a second ballot in October 2016).  The 
unintended consequence of this concatenation of rule change and nomination naivety plunged 
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Labour into a crisis over whether Labour should be an activist-driven campaigning party that 
articulates a radical voice for the dispossessed or a realistically aspirant party of government 
that, in office, could genuinely improve the lives of ‘ordinary working people’.  Corbyn’s 
victory has given many Labour activists the voice and policies they have always wanted.  But 
it has distanced the party from both the median voter and traditional Labour voters and left 
large numbers of Labour MPs wondering how on earth the party can ever recover electorally.  
As I will discuss in the final section, there is an opportunity here for a new centre-ground 
political force in the UK, if enough Labour MPs can convince themselves that the need for 
politicians to take practical action which improves ordinary people’s lives is more important 
than out-dated notions of party loyalty and betrayal.  
The third elite decision worth mentioning is David Cameron’s decision, in the run-up to the 
2015 general election, to promise an ‘in/out’ referendum on Britain’s EU membership by 
2017.  Cameron clearly expected that he would be able to negotiate a deal (on improved 
membership terms for the UK) with the UK’s EU partners that would be acceptable to the 
UK public, and that he would accordingly win any such referendum.  His failure to 
understand the risks he was running or to campaign effectively for the deal he had secured 
resulted in his rapid political demise and his replacement by a Conservative government that 
seems bent on both a ‘hard Brexit’ and on moving the Conservatives firmly to the 
authoritarian right.  The centre of gravity of the Conservative Party under Theresa May has 
shifted towards an anti-Europeanist, anti-immigrant, anti-human-rights stance that leaves the 
pro-EU social liberals, who formed the vanguard of the party under Cameron, very isolated.  
As with Labour’s centrists, Tory centrists have an opportunity to defect from a party with 
which they no longer have very much in common.  Again, this is an issue to which I return in 
the final section. 
The factors outlined above offer an incomplete and largely anecdotal account of why party 
fragmentation has increased in Britain in recent decades.  There are two further (measurable) 
factors, however, where more specific corroborating evidence can be provided.  Yet even 
here, the corroboration is limited in the sense that these measurable factors all suffer from a 
potential ‘endogeneity’ problem  (a problem, incidentally, that besets large swathes of social 
science research) – that is, they are all subject to the potential criticism that they are the 
consequence of declining support for the two main parties, rather than its cause.  Given that 
the necessary data for resolving this sort of endogeneity problem are not available, I simply 
hypothesise that these two measurables do indeed underpin the fragmentation process and 
then examine the data to determine whether or not they are consistent with such a claim. 
The decline of Party Identification.  Party identification (or PID) is one of the most 
commonly used concepts in the explanation of voting patterns.  It can be characterised in 
various ways but in essence constitutes an individual’s long-term predisposition to support 
one party rather than another – though such predispositions can change over time (Clarke et 
al, 2004). Analyses of PID typically differentiate among Very Strong, Fairly Strong and Not 
Very Strong Identifiers, all of whom are distinguished from Non-identifiers.  Identifying with 
a party is not a guarantee that an individual will support it, but Very Strong Identification 
with a party is a powerful indication that an individual will indeed vote for it at the next 
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election.  Equally, having no identification generally signifies that an individual’s vote is ‘up 
for grabs’ at any given election – that vote choices will be affected more by perceptions of 
leadership qualities, evaluations of policy platforms, and assessments of the likely managerial 
competencies of the rival leadership teams.  
Figure 8 shows the aggregate changes in strength of party identification between 1964 (when 
PID was first systematically measured in the UK) and 2015.  Fairly Strong identifiers remain 
broadly constant at around 40% of voters. Not Very Strong identifiers – the least committed 
identifiers – increase from around 10% to about 23%.  However, Very Strong Identifiers 
decline from 45% of voters in 1964 to 15% in 2015.  And crucially, people with No 
Identification have increased from 5% of the electorate to over 20%.  Figure 9 presents the 
data in a slightly different form, showing how PID strength has fallen for the two major 
parties and for the Liberal Democrats since 1964.  For simplicity of presentation, the strength 
measures are presented in index form. The two figures tell the same story, however. 
Together, they show conclusively that voters have become progressively less committed to 
the main established political parties in the half century since 1964.  It is hardly surprising in 
these circumstances that they have been prepared to vote for a wider range of newer, 
alternative parties – they have behaved more like discriminating consumers than committed 
partisans – thus  contributing to the Westminster vote and seat fragmentation described in the 
previous section. 
The decline of class-based voting.  A second measurable factor that has contributed to party 
fragmentation in Westminster voting is the decline of social class as a source of voting 
choice.  Traditionally, people from manual working class families disproportionately 
supported Labour whilst non-manual middle class voters disproportionately supported the 
Conservatives.  Table 2 displays the relationship between vote and social class in 1964, and 
again in 2015.  The contrast between the two elections could not be clearer.  In 1964, just 
under two-thirds of middle class voters supported the Conservatives and a similar proportion 
of working class voters supported Labour: there was a very clear relationship between class 
and vote. By 2015, the class/vote nexus had weakened considerably. While the Conservatives 
garnered slightly more middle class votes (43%) than working class ones (33%), Labour’s 
support was almost the same among the middle class (31%) as it was among the manual 
working class (33%).  Class-based voting in fact declined progressively after 1964.  Figure 10 
reports a simple class/vote ‘consistency index’ that can be calculated, for every general 
election since 1964, from tables analogous to those shown in Table 2. The data for 2016 
relate to voting intentions rather than reported vote. As the figure shows, class has all but 
disappeared as a factor in vote choice.   
The mechanism through which declining class-voting contributes to party fragmentation is 
simple. Parties with a clear class base, of the sort enjoyed by Labour and the Conservatives 
from the 1930s to the 1960s, find it relatively easy to garner votes from that class 
demographic.  But a third party challenger has to position itself to attract working class votes 
from Labour and/or middle class votes from the Conservatives.  This is an extraordinarily 
difficult task to accomplish in constituencies of different types given that it is important to 
convey a consistent national-level campaigning message in order to present an image of 
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policy and managerial competence.  As class-based voting weakens, however, not only do the 
original class-based parties have to make new non-class appeals to attract support, but third 
parties too have an equal opportunity to make non-class appeals.  In fact, as class-based 
voting declines, all parties increasingly have to engage in what Riker (1986) termed 
heresthetics – the conscious effort to focus political debates and divisions on ‘new’ issue 
dimensions or cleavages that are conducive to their own interests.  The SNP, for example, 
have been outstandingly successful on re-structuring political debate in Scotland around 
Scottish interests and which party is best placed to advance them.  The decline of class as the 
basis of the vote has simply created more opportunities for newer parties to frame issues and 
mobilise support on a more level playing field than previously – though FPTP still represents 
a constraining influence by restricting the ‘fair’ translation of national vote share into 
Westminster seats (for all but the SNP). 
The implication of the foregoing discussion is that the long-term declines of party 
identification and class-voting have both played roles in the growing fragmentation of 
Westminster voting.  Tables 3 and 4 test this proposition. Table 3 shows the correlations, 
across the 14 elections 1964-2015, between (a) changes in vote fragmentation and (b) 
changes in party identification and class-voting. PID is measured as the percentage of the 
electorate with no party identification; class-voting is measured using the Consistency Index 
outlined above.
4
  The table shows, as expected, that fragmentation is positively correlated 
with the proportion of the electorate with no party identification (r=.89: as the proportion of 
Non-Identifiers has increased, fragmentation has increased)) and negatively correlated with 
class-vote (r=-.93: as class-voting has declined, fragmentation has risen).  
Table 4 reports two simple multivariate models of vote fragmentation, 1964-2015.  The left-
hand segment of Table 4 presents an OLS model which suggests that both PID (b=.032) and 
Class-Vote (b=-.014) exert statistically significant effects on fragmentation.  However, 
inspection of the OLS model’s residuals indicated that they are generated by a second order 
autoregressive process or AR(2).  The right-hand segment of Table 4 accordingly re-
estimates the model as an AR(2).  The results show that No Identification and Class-Vote 
continue to be statistically significant and correctly signed. With only 14 cases in this sort of 
time-series, it is risky to set too much store by statistical modelling of these relationships.  
However, the results are certainly consistent with the claim that the upward trend in 
fragmentation is significantly affected by the downward trends in PID and class-voting since 
1964. This is not to say the ‘unmeasurable’ factors mentioned earlier are not also important – 
merely that their effects cannot readily be assessed empirically, even in the imperfect manner 
described in Tables 3 and 4.
5
   
4. Britain’s current political tribes and the potential for a party-system re-alignment 
The referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union held in July 2016 
highlighted the growing appeal of Authoritarian Populism (AP) among the British public. 
Indeed, since UKIP’s emergence as an electoral force after the 2010 general election (and 
particularly after its performance in the May 2014 European Parliament elections), it has been 
clear that authoritarian populist sentiments have become an increasingly important feature of 
12 
 
the UK political landscape.  This is not to say that voting for extreme right-wing parties, or 
voting for UKIP, provides a simple measure of the extent of the electorate’s AP thinking.   
Rather, AP is best viewed as a constellation of five sets of attitudes that relate to: the 
individual’s position on the left-right ideological spectrum; cynicism about the importance 
and desirability of protecting human rights (which mainstream political parties take for 
granted); concern about and opposition to immigration (an issue, at least until recently, 
consistently underplayed by successive governments); opposition to the EU; and strong 
support for a robust national defence and foreign policy (see Sanders, Scotto and Reifler, 
2016).    
Table 5 reports the results of an exploratory factor analysis on five measures of AP attitudes.  
The results show clearly that a single dimension underlies the five measures.  An alpha-scale 
test for uni-dimensionality among the same variable set yields =0.75 (above the standard 0.7 
cut-off), suggesting that the five measures do indeed form an Authoritarian Populist scale on 
which any given individual can be located.  Analyses of the consequences of AP, not reported 
here, show that net of the effects of other key predictors, AP attitudes have powerful effects 
on Westminster voting intention, EU referendum vote and democracy satisfaction.   
The same AP measures can also be analysed using cluster analysis, to establish if there are 
groupings of individuals who constitute distinctive attitudinal types.  It is not a simple task to 
decide how many clusters to estimate for any given set of variables and individuals.  For the 
purposes of analysis here, 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-cluster solutions were estimated.  The details are 
provided in Annex 3.  The results there show that the 2-cluster solution fails to distinguish 
between two sorts of Authoritarian Populists – those in the centre of the political spectrum 
and those on the far right.  Similarly, the 3-cluster solution fails to differentiate between 
centrist APs and centre-right liberals.  The 5-cluster solution, in contrast, identifies one 
cluster that contains only 12 (1%) of the 1265 respondents sampled – a sure sign that this 
grouping is insufficiently important to merit serious consideration as a distinct ‘type’.  
As Table 6 indicates, however, the 4-cluster solution tells a compelling story about the UK’s 
new political tribes, and their relative sizes, in an era of renewed authoritarian populism.  
Note that this story reveals a subtlety about contemporary British political attitudes that 
would not be evident if only left/right ideology were considered.  The table reports the mean 
scores on each of the five AP measures for each of the four clusters.  With minor exceptions, 
the mean scores on each AP component measure increase as we move down the table from 
Liberal Internationalist Pro-EU Left to Authoritarian Populist Right.  (For example the mean 
Critical of Human Rights score increases progressively from 2.08 to 3.83 as we move down 
the table).  The only major exception – and this is where the importance of considering more 
than just left/right ideology is borne out – relates to the mean left/right scale score for the 
Liberal Pro-EU Centre-Right (6.28) – which is significantly higher than the equivalent score 
for the Authoritarian Populist Centre (5.02).  In short, there is a sizeable group (estimated at 
15% of the UK electorate) that is clearly to the right of the political spectrum but which 
equally clearly rejects AP attitudes and values.  Together with the Liberal Internationalist 
Pro-EU Left (estimated at 37%), these non-APs represent just over half of the electorate, 
compared with the two groupings of APs – the AP Centre (29%) and the AP Right (19%). 
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The key issue that follows from the identification of these four groupings or clusters (‘tribes’) 
is what consequences they might have for changing patterns of party support.  Table 7 reports 
the relationship between Tribe and Vote based on column percentages.  As the table shows, 
almost two-thirds of Liberal Internationalists (65%) support Labour, though to a lesser extent 
they also support the Liberal Democrats and Others (in effect, Greens, SNP and PC).  The 
Liberal Pro-EU Centre-Right strongly supports the Conservatives (67%) and to a lesser 
extent the Lib-Dems (17 %).  The AP Centre distributes its support across the Conservatives 
(42%), Labour (21%) and UKIP (25%).  The AP Right is overwhelmingly Conservative 
(75%), with most of the remainder supporting UKIP (21%).   
Table 8 reports the same data, but this time presenting row percentages.  This enables us to 
analyse the spread of party support across the four tribes (now labelled as T1, T2, T3 and T4) 
more easily.  The results are instructive.  The Conservatives have the most diversified support 
portfolio, deriving substantial support from T2, T3 and T4.  This degree of dispersal is 
potentially a source of long-term electoral strength, though it is possible that Theresa May’s 
authoritarian tendencies with regard to immigration may combine with a ‘hard Brexit’ to 
alienate the remaining Conservative supporters in T2, the Liberal Pro-EU Centre-Right.  
Labour, in contrast, is largely dependent on T1 and risks losing its remaining supporters in T3 
either to UKIP or to a newly authoritarian Conservative party that strengthens its opposition 
to immigration and human rights and at the same promises more redistribution.  UKIP, which 
is dependent entirely on AP support, is clearly vulnerable to the Conservatives now that its 
original raison d’etre has gone and Euroscepticism dominates the Cabinet. Finally, the Lib-
Dems and Others are dependent primarily on the Liberal Internationalist T1 tribe for their 
support – and their efforts to increase their support levels there are likely to make life even 
more difficult for Jeremy Corbyn’s increasingly sectarian Labour Party. 
All of this suggests that the situation in the UK is ripe for a party realignment around the 
political centre.  The Conservatives are clearly in a position to undercut UKIP and reinforce 
their support among the AP Centre and AP Right as the May government adopts a more 
aggressive foreign policy stance, stands firmly against immigration, and moves towards a 
hard Brexit.  If there are no Tory defections from this increasingly authoritarian populist 
position, the Conservatives could become the dominant party of UK electoral politics.  In 
these circumstances, however, the Conservative centre-left would have very little in common 
with anti-EU, anti-immigrant, anti-human-rights mainstream of the party. The Tory centre-
left group in the Commons is almost certainly smaller than the 128 Conservative MPs who 
committed themselves formally to the Remain camp in the EU referendum.  However, it is 
probably at least half that size, even after David Cameron’s resignation as an MP.  If the Tory 
centre-left could bring itself to put national interest above party loyalty (never a small 
matter!), it could defect to a new democratic centre party or even to the Lib-Dems, with a 
realistic possibility of bringing the support of most of the T2 tribe with them.  
Labour under Corbyn, for its part, is likely to see its support increasingly restricted to T1, the 
Liberal Internationalist, Pro-EU Left.  Even though T1 (with a 37% share) is numerically the 
largest single tribe, Labour has to compete for T1 support with other liberal parties, and it is 
seriously hampered in its electoral efforts by widespread negative voter perceptions of both 
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its leadership and its managerial competence. Corbyn’s overwhelming victory in the party’s 
leadership vote in October 2016 means that Labour’s centre-left has lost its battle for control 
of the party.  Like the liberal Tories who are isolated in an increasingly authoritarian populist 
Conservative party, Labour’s centre-left MPs have less and less in common with a leadership 
that fails to understand voters’ concerns about immigration, and which sees Labour primarily 
as an activist-driven campaigning party that articulates a radical voice for the dispossessed 
rather than as a (necessarily compromising) party of government. In these circumstances, 
Labour’s centre-left should seriously consider defection. The empowerment of Labour’s 
grass-roots constituency activists under the post-2014 leadership rules and Corbyn’s victory 
together mean that Labour stands no prospect of occupying the political centre ground of 
British politics. If Labour’s centre-left (the majority of its current MPs) allow party loyalty to 
dominate their actions, they seriously risk condemning the British electorate to the electoral 
hegemony of an increasingly authoritarian Conservative government in the future.  If, on the 
other hand, they recognise that the need to protect liberal, internationalist values is more 
important than personal ambition and misplaced loyalty to a party that has moved radically to 
the left, then defection to a new centre party could provide a plausible vehicle for protecting 
those values.  A new centre party (or a reconstructed Lib-Dem party) could realistically bid 
for dominance among T1 and T2 voters, giving it a serious chance of challenging the 
Conservatives in 2020.   
Summary and Conclusions 
The UK party system has always been subject to change and occasionally, as with the 
replacement of the Liberals by Labour in the 1920s, to fundamental change.  Since the 1950s, 
the electorate has increasingly signalled its collective preference, even at Westminster, for a 
more multi-party system.  The Number of Effective Parties in terms of votes has increased 
from two in 1951 to almost four in 2015.  To be sure, First-Past-the-Post has constrained the 
seat shares of alternative parties so that even by 2015 the Number of Effective Parties in 
terms of seats had risen to only 2.5.    
With regard to the ‘measurable’ influences on this increasing fragmentation of voting 
preferences, the key drivers of change appear to have been the declines in class voting and 
party identification.  Declining class voting increases the opportunities for alternative parties 
to open up new issues and cleavages while declining party identification makes more voters 
available for recruitment to alternative causes.  In both cases, third parties can compete more 
effectively thereby increasing vote-fragmentation.  These ‘measurables’ have almost certainly 
been complemented by such ‘unmeasurables’ as the rise of alternative identities and 
increased media and social media criticism of politicians and conventional politics.  These 
effects have been reinforced by certain decisions of party leaders that have added to the 
deeper centrifugal forces encouraging party fragmentation.  In Labour’s case, the decision to 
move to genuine One-Member-One-Vote in 2014, combined with a naïve approach to the 
Leader nomination by the Parliamentary Labour Party after the 2015 general election defeat, 
has enabled left-wing grassroots activists to take control of the party.  This is a position they 
will not lightly relinquish but it has seriously (some would argue, fatally) weakened Labour’s 
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electoral prospects by shifting the party’s centre of political gravity too far away both from 
Labour’s traditional support base and from the median voter.  As far as the Conservatives are 
concerned, Cameron’s overweening confidence and unpreparedness to listen to advice in 
committing to a referendum on Britain’s EU membership and his subsequent failure properly 
to prepare public opinion before calling the referendum itself were hugely damaging to the 
project he was seeking to advance. They led to the termination of his pro-EU liberal 
leadership of the party and its replacement by a more hardline anti-EU and authoritarian May 
government. 
Underpinning the rise of UKIP since 2010 and the Leave victory in June 2016 has been the 
growth of Authoritarian Populist sentiment among the UK electorate. Indeed, Authoritarian 
Populist attitudes (and their antitheses) now constitute an important defining dimension of 
UK public opinion and electoral politics.  Cluster analysis of these AP attitudes suggests 
there are now four ‘tribes’ of UK voters: the Liberal Internationalist Pro-EU Left; the Liberal, 
Pro-EU Centre-Right; the Authoritarian Populist Centre; and the Authoritarian Populist 
Right.  Under Corbyn, Labour’s support base in the Liberal Internationalist Pro-EU Left is far 
too limited for it to prosper electorally – especially as it faces competition from other liberal 
parties such as the Lib-Dems, the SNP and Plaid among that group of voters. At the same 
time, liberal pro-EU Conservatives have little in common with an Authoritarian Populist-
dominated Conservative leadership that appears bent on hard Brexit and which draws most of 
its electoral support from the AP Centre and AP Right. Indeed, on the key issues of Europe, 
human rights, immigration and the fiscally responsible mixed economy, the Conservative 
centre has much more in common with the vast majority of anti-Corbyn Labour MPs than it 
does with its own government and party activists.  Conservatives do not have a history of 
splitting and Labour activists and MPs have a visceral fear (if not hatred) of it.  However, the 
long-term loosening of party identifications and of class-based voting outlined above have 
created a new situation that is very different from previous occasions (such as 1931 or 1981) 
when serious splits in the major parties have been on the political agenda. 
Fundamental policy differences within the two main parties are becoming increasingly 
evident.  Combined with the new divisions in the electorate associated with the four tribes 
described above, Conservative and Labour centre liberals would have little to lose and much 
to gain by defecting from their respective parties.  To avoid more party fragmentation and the 
vicious circle consequences of First-Past-the-Post, they could explore the possibility of 
working with the Liberal-Democrats to form a new party of the liberal, democratic centre.  
Such a party grouping could expect to prosper in a general election, especially with Rump 
Labour fighting UKIP for working class votes in the North and Midlands and the 
Conservatives and UKIP competing for Authoritarian Populist votes across the country.  For 






Figure 1: Conservative, Labour, Liberal (Democrat) and Other Parties Vote Shares in 
General Elections, 1832-2015 
 
Source: David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts (Basingstoke: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2011) and, for 2015, www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results.  
 
Figure 2: SNP Vote Share in Scotland and Plaid Cymru Vote Shares in Wales in UK 
general elections, 1929-2016 
 


















































































































































































































Figure 3: Party Vote Shares (List Vote) in Scottish Parliament Elections, 1999-2016 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_Parliament_election  
 















































Figure 6: Number of Major UK Cities with No Overall Control, 1945-2016 (N=22) 
 
 

























Figure 7: Effective Number of Parties in terms of Votes and Seats, UK 1900-2015 
 
Source: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/ and own 
calculations from sources cited in Figure 1  
 
 
Figure 8: Percent Very Strong, Fairly Strong, Not Very Strong and No Party 
Identifiers, 1964-2015 
 




















































































































































































































Figure 9: Strength of Party Identification with Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat Parties, 1964-2015 
 
Source: BES cross-section surveys, 1964-2015.  The index figure reported are calculated as 
averages of individual scores where Very Strong Identification with a party scores 3; Fairly 

















Table 1: Effective Number of Parties (EPN) in terms of Votes and Seats and Gallaher 







Northern Ireland Average, 1998-2016 5.11 4.54 0.57 3.61 
Scotland Average, 1999-2016 4.27 3.32 1.05 7.00 
Wales Average, 1999-2016 4.40 3.07 1.33 10.36 
Source: own calculations based on data as in Figures 3-5 
 





Conservative 62 (a) 28 (b) 
Labour 22 (c) 64 (d) 
Other 16 8 






Conservative 43 33 
Labour 31 33 
Other 26 34 
Class Consistency Index 12 
Source: BES cross-sections,1964 and 2015.  Column Percentages reported.  Class 
Consistency Index is measured as (a-b) + (d-c) [Theoretical range 0-200] 
 
Table 3: Correlations between (a) Effective Number of Parties–Votes and (b) No Party 




Percent No Party Identification +.89 
Class-Vote Consistency Index -.93 






Table 4: Models of Party Fragmentation (Effective Number of Parties-Votes), 1964-
2015, OLS and Autoregressive Specifications 
 OLS Model AR(2) Model 
 Coeff St Err Sig Coeff St Err Sig 
Percent No Party Identification 0.032 .016 .064 0.031 .016 .013 
Class Voting Consistency Index Score -0.014 .004 .004 -0.015 .003 .000 
Constant 3.430 .374 .000 3.450 .254 .000 
Ut-1    -0.509  .054 
Ut-2    -0.510  .054 
Corrected R2 0.887   0.917   
Durbin Watson 2.684   2.350   
Dependent variable is Effective Number of Parties in terms of Votes. Sample: General 
Election Events 1964-2015.  N=14 
 
Table 5: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Five Indicators of Authoritarian Populism, 
2016 
Component Variable Range Loading Uniqueness 
Left/Right self-placement 0-10 0.59 0.65 
Britain Strong and Tough Foreign Policy  0-1 0.54 0.71 
Negative emotions on immigration 0-4 0.67 0.54 
Critical of Human Rights 1-5 0.73 0.47 
Disapproval of EU 1-5 0.73 0.47 
Eigenvalue Factor 1 = 2.15; Factor 2 = 0.02.  N=1265.  For precise variable definitions see 
Annex 4. Source: YouGov 12-Nation Authoritarian Populism Survey, October 2016 
 

























.10 1.79 2.08 .31 3.07 37 
Liberal Pro-EU  
Centre-Right 
.26 1.77 2.84 .68 6.28 15 
Authoritarian 
Populist Centre 
.44 4.36 3.65 1.72 5.02 29 
Authoritarian 
Populist Right 


















Table 7: Vote Intention by Political Tribe 2016, Column Percentages 
 Liberal 
Internationalist 










Conservative 7 67 42 75 
Labour 65 17 21 0 
LibDem 12 9 4 0 
UKIP 1 0 25 21 
Other 16 6 8 3 
Source: YouGov 12-Nation Authoritarian Populism Survey, October 2016 
 
Table 8: Vote Intention by Political Tribe 2016, Row Percentages 












Conservative 7 25 29 39 
Labour 75 8 17 0 
LibDem 63 20 16 1 
UKIP 2 0 59 38 
Other 62 10 21 7 
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Annex 1: The Trend in UK Government Popularity, 1947-2016 
Figure A1: Monthly Variations in Government Popularity, January 1947 – August 2016 
 
Government Popularity measured as the percent intending vote for the governing party, 
average of all published opinion polls. For the period of the 2010-2015 coalition government, 
the figures are Conservative vote intention. 
A simple trend function can be estimated as Government Popularity = 49.34 – 0.19 Time.  
Both the constant and the coefficient are significant at p<.000; r2 is -.33. The more elaborate 
specification outlined in the table above includes controls for the major political events of the 
1947-2016 period. 
 
Table A1: Lagged Endogenous Variable Model of UK Government Popularity 1947-
2016, with controls for Key Political Events 
 Coefficient Std Error Significance 
Government Popularity t-1 0.94 0.01 .000 
Time 0.001 0.0003 .002 
Change of government dummy 4.46 0.88 .000 
Suez Crisis (November 1956) 3.95 2.40 .100 











Winter of Discontent (December 1978-March 1979) -2.70 1.02 .008 
Falklands War (May, June 1982) 6.72 1.54 .000 
Poll Tax (March 1990) -4.80 2.40 .046 
ERM crisis (October 1992) -5.25 2/40 .029 
New Labour boost (May 1997) 7.01 2.82 .013 
Blair Honeymoon (May-October 1997) 3.75 0.94 .000 
Fuel crisis (September 2000) -6.55 2.40 .007 
Iraq War (May 2003) -2.97 2.40 .216 
Financial Crisis (November 2007) -5.87 2.40 .015 
Expenses Scandal (May 2009) -7.37 2.40 .002 
Constant 2.84 0.55 .000 
Ut-1 -.22 6.42 .000 
Ut-2 -.05 1.33 .184 
Corrected R2 0.91   
Durbin Watson 2.00   
Dependent variable is Government Popularity, monthly average intending to vote for 
governing party as indicated by the average of all monthly polls. Estimation by Exact AR(2) 
Newton-Raphson Iterative Method after OLS diagnostics showed that the OLS residuals were 
generated by an AR(2) process.  All independent variables other than lagged dependent 
variable are dummies (1 for the months specified; zero otherwise). Sample: 1947M2-
2016m8; N=835.   
The results in the table show that the time trend effect remains significant even when a lagged 





Annex 2: Lagged Models of Party Fragmentation (Effective Number of Parties-Votes), 
Party Identification and Class-Voting, 1964-2015 
When variables are potentially reciprocally related, Granger causality tests can be used to 
shed light on claims that any causal connection from X to Y rather than from Y to X. The 
simplest way of effecting such tests is to see if lagged values of X (e.g. Xt-1) predict Yt and/or 
if lagged values of Y predict Xt.  We could conclude X affected Y, for example, if Xt-1 
predicted Yt but Yt-1 did not predict Xt. Table A2 undertakes these tasks.  The coefficients of 
interest and their associated significance levels are highlighted in yellow.  As the Table 
indicates, lagged (t-1) values of No Identification and ClassVote both significantly affect 
EPNVotes at time t but lagged values of EPNVotes do not significantly affect either No 
Identification of ClassVote.  These results clearly support the idea that it is PID and Classvote 
that affect party fragmentation rather than vice versa. 
Table A2: Lagged Endogenous Variable Models of EPNVotes, No Identification and 
Class-Vote, 1964-2015 
 EPNVotest No PIDt ClassVotet 
 Coeff St Err Sig Coeff St Err Sig Coeff St Err Sig 
EPNVotest-1 -.60 .32 .09 -5.89 3.98 .17 3.97 18.93 .84 
No PIDt-1 .08 .02 .00 .91 .25 .01 -2.32 1.17 .08 
ClassVotet-1 -.02 .01 .03 -.16 .08 .08 .49 .38 .23 
Constant 4.29 1.18 .00 28.39 14.57 .08 35.77 69.24 .62 
Corrected R
2
 .86         
DW 2.02   2.00   2.08   
LM (2) 1 .06  .80 .01  .90 .66  .42 
Sample: general election events 1964-2015. N=13. Estimation by OLS.  EPNVotes is the 
Effective Number of Parties in terms of Votes cast. No Identification is the Percentage of 
Non-Party-Identifiers in each BES cross-sectional survey. ClassVote is the Class-Voting 
Consistency Index.  
The raw data for these estimates are as follows: 
Election EPNVotes No Identification ClassVote 
1964 2.53 5 76 
1966 2.42 7 83 
1970 2.46 8 78 
1974f 3.13 9 50 
1974o 3.15 9 51 
1979 2.87 12 42 
1983 3.46 14 45 
1987 3.33 12 43 
1992 3.06 10 46 
1997 3.22 12 36 
2001 3.33 16 37 
2005 3.59 17 28 
2010 3.71 22 34 
2015 3.91 21 12 
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2-clusters        
Cluster A1 66.5 3.86 .24 .88 2.71 2.84 
Cluster A2 33.5 7.09 .40 1.23 3.37 2.96 
3-clusters        
Cluster B1 37.3 3.07 .10 .31 2.08 1.79 
Cluster B2 29.2 5.02 .44 1.72 3.65 4.36 
Cluster B3 33.5 7.09 .40 1.23 3.37 2.96 
4-clusters        
Cluster C1 37.3 3.07 .10 .31 2.08 1.79 
Cluster C2 29.2 5.02 .44 1.72 3.65 4.36 
Cluster C3 14.9 6.28 .26 .67 2.84 1.77 
Cluster C4 18.6 7.79 .53 1.71 3.84 4.46 
5-clusters        
Cluster D1 37.3 3.07 .10 .31 2.08 1.79 
Cluster D2 28.2 5.10 .44 1.67 3.61 4.34 
Cluster D3 1.0 2.75 .50 3.25 4.58 4.75 
Cluster D4 14.9 6.28 .26 .67 2.84 1.77 
Cluster D5 18.6 7.79 .53 1.71 3.84 4.46 
Cell entries, except where specified, are mean scores within the relevant cluster. Total 




Annex 4: Question Wordings for Component Authoritarian Populism Measures 
 
Ideological sympathy for market and rolling back of the state. Respondent’s self-
placement on 0-10 Left-Right scale. The measure is an average of the self-placements made 
by each respondent across waves 1, 2 and 4 of the survey.  Other components all measured at 
Wave 10. 
 
Britain Strong and Tough Foreign Policy. Question: From the list of foreign policy 
priorities, please select the one you think the United Kingdom should pursue in the 21
st
 
Century (figures in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents choosing each 
category): Helping the rest of the world by providing foreign aid and protecting human rights 
(12%); Solving international problems by working with other nations and working through 
international organizations (44%); Protecting British interests by being strong and tough with 
other nations and maintaining a powerful military (33%); Avoiding involvement with other 
nations by simply minding our own business in international affairs (12%). The measure used 
is a dummy where 1=chose the ‘strong and tough’ option, 0=not.  
 
Negative Emotional Response to Immigration.  Question: Please indicate which of the 
following emotions you feel towards immigrants: Angry, Happy, Disgusted, Hopeful, 
Uneasy, Confident, Afraid, and Proud.  The measure is the sum of negative emotions (angry, 
disgusted, uneasy, afraid) specified by the respondent.  
 
Critical of Human Rights. Statement:  People who talk about protecting human rights are 
mainly interested in protecting the rights of criminals, not those of their victims. Strongly 
agree (19%); Agree (26%); Neither agree nor disagree (22%); Disagree (16%); Strongly 
disagree (11%). 
 
Disapproval of European Union. Question: Overall do you strongly approve, approve, 
disapprove or strongly disapprove of the European Union?  Strongly approve (13%); 














                                                          
1
 As Annex 1 shows, if we look at long-term opinion poll evidence, support for the governing 
party fell gradually but consistently from the late 1940s through to 2016, regardless of which 
party was in power. A simple trend function suggests that governing parties in the 2010s were 
on average 15 percentage points less popular that their counterparts in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. 
2
 The Effective Number of Parties is defined as N = 1/(Pi
2
) where Pi is the proportion of 
seats (or votes) obtained by each party in the parliament. 
3
 There are other more technical ways of calculating disproportionality.  A common method 
is the Gallaher (1991) Index which takes into account the differences between each vote share 
and its seat share.  On this measure, disproportionality at Westminster stood at 15.0 in 2015, 
compared with a European average of 6.5 for the period 2011-2015. 
4
 The raw data are presented in Annex 2. 
5
 Table A2 in Annex 2 takes the issue of causal direction a little further by regressing vote 
fragmentation on lagged values of PID and Class-Vote; and vice versa.  The results are 
consistent with the conclusion that PID and Class-Vote are not endogenous to fragmentation. 
